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Can Neurotypical Individuals Read Autistic Facial Expressions?
Atypical Production of Emotional Facial Expressions in Autism
Spectrum Disorders
Rebecca Brewer, Federica Biotti, Caroline Catmur, Clare Press, Francesca Happe, Richard Cook,
and Geoffrey Bird
The difficulties encountered by individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) when interacting with neurotypical
(NT, i.e. nonautistic) individuals are usually attributed to failure to recognize the emotions and mental states of their
NT interaction partner. It is also possible, however, that at least some of the difficulty is due to a failure of NT indi-
viduals to read the mental and emotional states of ASD interaction partners. Previous research has frequently
observed deficits of typical facial emotion recognition in individuals with ASD, suggesting atypical representations of
emotional expressions. Relatively little research, however, has investigated the ability of individuals with ASD to pro-
duce recognizable emotional expressions, and thus, whether NT individuals can recognize autistic emotional expres-
sions. The few studies which have investigated this have used only NT observers, making it impossible to determine
whether atypical representations are shared among individuals with ASD, or idiosyncratic. This study investigated NT
and ASD participants’ ability to recognize emotional expressions produced by NT and ASD posers. Three posing con-
ditions were included, to determine whether potential group differences are due to atypical cognitive representations
of emotion, impaired understanding of the communicative value of expressions, or poor proprioceptive feedback.
Results indicated that ASD expressions were recognized less well than NT expressions, and that this is likely due to a
genuine deficit in the representation of typical emotional expressions in this population. Further, ASD expressions
were equally poorly recognized by NT individuals and those with ASD, implicating idiosyncratic, rather than com-
mon, atypical representations of emotional expressions in ASD. Autism Res 2015, 00: 000–000. VC 2015 The Authors
Autism Research published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of International Society for Autism Research
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Introduction
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by
impaired communication and social interaction, and
restricted and repetitive interests [American Psychiatric
Association, 2013]. Although not required for diagnosis,
it is often assumed that social interaction atypicalities
stem, in part, from deficits of emotion recognition
[Harms, Martin, & Wallace, 2010]. Emotion processing
atypicalities would be detrimental to social interactions,
where correct recognition of the emotional state of one’s
interaction partner allows for an appropriate response.
While evidence for emotion recognition deficits in ASD
has been equivocal [Harms et al., 2010], it is still the case
that numerous studies have observed atypical recogni-
tion of others’ emotions in this population [Ashwin,
Chapman, Colle, & Baron-Cohen, 2006; Dziobek,
Bahnemann, Convit, & Heekeren, 2010; Greimel et al.,
2010; Lindner & Rosen, 2006]. Recent evidence suggests
that co-occurring alexithymia, associated with atypical
recognition of others’ facial emotion [Grynberg et al.,
2012; Jessimer & Markham, 1997; Lane et al., 1996;
McDonald & Prkachin, 1990; Swart, Kortekaas, & Ale-
man, 2009] is, in fact, responsible for emotion recogni-
tion deficits in these individuals [Cook, Brewer, Shah, &
Bird, 2013]. However, the fact that alexithymia is highly
prevalent in ASD, with approximately 50% of individuals
meeting criteria for severe levels of alexithymia [Berthoz
& Hill, 2005; Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004], makes emo-
tion recognition problematic for many individuals with
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ASD, despite not being a necessary feature of the condi-
tion. Many individuals with ASD are, therefore, likely to
suffer deficits of facial emotion recognition, which, in
turn, impair social interaction.
It is clear that difficulties recognizing the emotions of
an interaction partner may reduce the quality of social
interactions, but little research has acknowledged the
fact that this is necessarily a bi- (or multi-) directional
process [Halberstadt, Denham, & Dunsmore, 2001];
interactions involve more than one individual, and
social cognition may vary depending on our engage-
ment in that interaction [Schilbach et al., 2013]. Indi-
viduals with ASD may be poor at reading neurotypical
(NT) facial expressions, but NT individuals may also be
impaired at reading ASD expressions. Both recognition
and production of emotional facial expressions rely on
internal representations of the underlying physical
components of each expression. During interactions,
successful conveyance of emotion relies on the individ-
uals involved sharing common representations of emo-
tions; when trying to interpret emotional signals, one
must compare the physical features of the observed
expression to those of one’s own internal representa-
tions of expressions. Similarly, when attempting to
convey a particular emotion, one must produce an
expression which matches the representation of that
emotion held by one’s interaction partner. A mismatch
between “sender” and “receiver” in underlying repre-
sentations for emotional expression would, therefore,
lead to a failure to communicate emotion [see also
Cook, Blakemore, & Press, 2013]. It is possible that past
testing of ASD emotion recognition, using solely NT
expressions, has resulted in an underestimation of ASD
capabilities; ASD individuals may be better able to read
the emotional expressions of ASD “senders”.
Given documented (although not universal) difficul-
ties in ASD in recognizing (NT) emotional expression, it
is important to know whether ASD individuals can send
clear emotional signals. There has been surprisingly little
experimental research on emotional expression differen-
ces in ASD [Begeer, Koot, Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, &
Stegge, 2008]. Previous evidence suggests atypical use of
nonverbal expressive behaviors in children with ASD in
naturalistic settings [Bieberich & Morgan, 2004; Capps,
Kasari, Yirmiya, & Sigman, 1993; Dawson, Hill, Spencer,
Galpert, & Watson, 1990; Kasari, Sigman, Mundy, &
Yirmiya, 1990; Snow, Hertzig, & Shapiro, 1887; Stagg,
Slavny, Hand, Cardoso, & Smith, 2014], reduced facial
muscle movements during play situations [Czapinski &
Bryson, 2003], and “awkward” facial expressions of emo-
tion during emotional story-telling [Grossman, Edelson,
& Tager-Flusberg, 2013]. In more explicit tasks of expres-
sion posing, observational evidence suggests that chil-
dren with ASD struggle to communicate happiness using
facial expressions [Langdell, 1981].
While evidence is mounting that suggests individuals
with ASD may express affect atypically, few studies
have specifically investigated the ability of these indi-
viduals to produce emotional facial expressions that are
recognizable by others. Macdonald et al. [1989] previ-
ously observed, in a sample of 10 high-functioning
adults with ASD, impaired ability to express facial emo-
tion in a way that could be correctly interpreted by NT
judges. More recently, Volker, Lopata, Smith, and Tho-
meer [2009] found in a larger sample of children that
NT raters were less able to recognize expressions of sad-
ness when produced by children with ASD than by typi-
cally developing children. ASD expressions were also
judged to be more “odd” than NT expressions. Faso
et al. [2014] similarly found that NT judges perceived
the facial expressions of adults with ASD to be less nat-
ural, and more intense, than of those without ASD. Sur-
prisingly, however, ASD emotion expressions of anger
were better recognized, and expressions of happiness
worse recognized, than NT expressions.
While these findings highlight atypical expression
production, which could be highly detrimental to the
social functioning of individuals with ASD, previous
studies are limited by small numbers of participants
expressing emotions, or raters attempting to recognize
them (typically 5 or 6 raters). Crucially, all studies have
included only NT individuals as raters. Just as employ-
ing NT facial expressions in recognition tasks may be
problematic, employing NT raters in expression tasks
may disadvantage ASD participants; individuals with
ASD may struggle to interact with NT individuals par-
tially due to problems interpreting typical expressions
of facial emotion, but also due to NT individuals find-
ing it difficult to interpret autistic expressions of emo-
tion. If ASD is associated with atypical emotion
representations, two possibilities exist; individuals with
ASD may have idiosyncratic representations (varying
between ASD individuals), or they may share common,
but atypical (varying from NT individuals), representa-
tions. If the latter is true, it is possible that those with
ASD are able to recognize the emotional facial expres-
sions of others with ASD, but not of NT individuals;
emotional expressions of ASD participants in previous
studies may have been correctly interpreted by autistic
raters. The consistent use of NT individuals on one side
of the artificial “interaction” in previous tasks may,
therefore, have placed individuals with ASD at a
disadvantage.
Whether atypicalities, should they exist, are system-
atic or idiosyncratic in ASD samples is an important
question, as it has strong implications for ASD sociality
and the way in which interventions are delivered. If
ASD expressions vary systematically from typical
expressions, individuals with ASD may be able to inter-
act with other individuals with ASD without emotion
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recognition difficulties, while interactions between ASD
and typical individuals may be characterized by expres-
sion recognition difficulties on both sides. If ASD
expressions are idiosyncratic, however, individuals with
ASD may struggle to interpret the expressions of all
other individuals, as well as express emotions in a way
others can understand, regardless of whether the
observer has ASD or not. Similarly, the existence of sys-
tematic variations would support the use of standard
interventions for the production of typical (and there-
fore, more recognizable) expressions, as the necessary
adjustments would be consistent across individuals.
Interventions for idiosyncratic expression production,
conversely, would require each individual’s variation
from typical expressions to be quantified and incorpo-
rated into the intervention.
Previous studies of emotional expression in ASD were
unable to determine the extent to which expression
atypicalities were due to atypical representation of emo-
tional information, or other confounded factors. While
unusual expressions may reflect atypical cognitive rep-
resentations of facial emotion (one’s internal depiction
of the physical attributes of each expression), consistent
with impaired emotion recognition in some individuals
with ASD, alternative explanations remain. Decreased
awareness about the communicative value of facial
expressions, or reduced motivation to transfer this
information, for example, could also cause atypical
expressions. Similarly, individuals with ASD may have
reduced proprioceptive awareness of facial muscle
movements [Weimer, Schatz, Lincoln, Ballantyne, &
Trauner, 2001]. Impaired feedback information con-
cerning one’s facial movements, or reduced ability to
process this information, may lead to atypical produc-
tion of expressions simply due to motor output being
poorly matched to internal representations of emotion,
rather than due to atypical representations themselves.
This study tested the hypothesis that individuals with
ASD produce atypical emotional expressions, due to
atypical representations of facial emotion. In order to
determine whether these representations differ system-
atically or idiosyncratically from NT expressions, the
ability of participants with and without ASD to recog-
nize these expressions was investigated. Finally, three
posing conditions allowed for distinction between atyp-
ical representations, communication awareness or moti-
vation, and proprioceptive awareness. These conditions
involved participants posing facial emotions naturally,
posing expressions with the aim of enabling the experi-
menter to correctly guess the emotion, and posing
expressions with visual feedback available. Use of these
conditions allowed the nature of any expression pro-
duction deficit to be investigated; if global representa-
tional problems exist in ASD, poorly recognizable
expressions would be produced in all conditions, while
communication awareness or proprioception problems
should result in an interaction between poser group
and posing condition (ASD expressions being poorly
recognized when produced in the standard posing con-
dition, but not in the communicative and visual feed-
back conditions, respectively). As previous findings
suggest that alexithymia can account for atypicalities in
emotion recognition, alexithymia was measured and




Participants. Sixteen adults with ASD (3 females)
and 17 NT individuals, with no clinical diagnosis (2
females) participated in stimulus development for this
study. ASD and control groups were matched according
to age [t(31)51.911, P50.065], gender [X250.480,
P50.489] and IQ [t(31)50.837, P50.409], measured
by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence
[WASI; Wechsler, 1999] and Wechsler Adult Intelli-
gence Scale [WAIS; Wechsler, 1997]. Autism symptom
severity was measured in all participants using the
Autism-Spectrum Quotient [AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheel-
wright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001]. Alexithymia
was measured using the Toronto Alexithymia Scale
[TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994]. Current func-
tioning of all individuals in the ASD group was assessed
with the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule
[ADOS; Lord et al., 2000]. ADOS scores meeting criteria
for ASD may be categorized as indicative of either
“autism” or “autism spectrum.” Of the 16 participants
with a clinical diagnosis of ASD, 14 also met the ADOS
criteria for ASD (10 for autism, 4 for autism spectrum).
Although two of the individuals in the ASD group did
not meet criteria for ASD, according to the ADOS, they
received diagnoses from independent clinicians and
one scored above cutoff for autism on the AQ.
Procedure. Poser participants were asked to pose the
six basic emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, surprise,
anger, disgust) while being recorded with a video cam-
era. Three posing conditions were used, and were com-
pleted in a standardized order. The first condition—the
standard condition—involved participants being
instructed to pose each emotion to the best of their
ability using facial expressions, and to express the emo-
tions for approximately 3 sec. Participants were asked
to precede and follow each emotional expression with a
neutral expression. Order of emotion type was random-
ized across participants. This posing condition was used
to determine individuals’ ability to pose expressions
without the use of visual feedback, and without the
INSAR Brewer et al./Expression production in autism 3
communicative value of expressions being emphasized.
It was intended to be the most similar to the conditions
in which individuals may deliberately pose facial
expressions in everyday life. The second,
“communicate,” condition was included to emphasize
the communicative value of emotional expressions, in
order that individuals with ASD should not be disad-
vantaged by potentially reduced comprehension of the
emotional information that can be conveyed to others
using facial expressions. This condition was used to
ensure that any differences between the ASD and con-
trol expressions were not simply due to individuals
with ASD failing to comprehend the informative nature
of facial expressions. The communicate condition
required participants to randomly select each of the six
emotions (written on cards) and pose it, in a way that
would allow the experimenter to guess which emotion
was being expressed. Following each expression, the
experimenter attempted to guess which emotion was
being expressed, and participants were instructed not to
give any feedback until the end of the task. The order
of the expressed emotions was tracked by participants
placing emotion cards face down in a pile once the rele-
vant expression had been posed, and recorded by the
experimenter. The third condition—the mirror condi-
tion—was included to investigate the impact of visual
feedback on participants’ expressive ability. This condi-
tion was included to ensure that any group differences
were not due to individuals with ASD having reduced
awareness of their facial movements. The mirror condi-
tion allowed individuals to produce the expression that
best matched their internal representation of the visual
features of each facial emotion, as the visual aspects of
their own expression could be monitored during pro-
duction. It involved participants posing the emotions
while watching their expressions in a camera, which
acted as a mirror. Again, order of emotion was random-
ized across participants.
Creation of static emotional facial expression
stimuli. Fifteen ASD individuals (3 females) and 12
NT participants (0 female) gave consent for stimuli to
be created from their video data and shown to other
participants in a behavioral study. From each of these
individuals, static stimuli were created depicting each
emotion, expressed in each of the three posing condi-
tions. This yielded a total of 486 stimuli. Each stimulus
was a single frame selected from each expression video.
Frames were selected such that they depicted the final
state of the expression, before the participant relaxed
into a neutral expression. Frames were independently
selected by two trained raters, and where disagreements
occurred, raters discussed frame selection and reached a
consensus. Static expression images were then con-
verted to grayscale, and cropped to exclude hair and
external features (Fig. 1). The 486 resulting images were
used in the following behavioral paradigm.
Emotion Recognition Phase
Participants. Fourteen adults with ASD (1 female)
and 13 control individuals (0 female) participated in
this study. Of these participants, 10 ASD participants
and 4 NT participants had taken part in the stimulus
production stage. Participants were matched according
to gender (X250.96, P50.326) and IQ [t(25)51.68,
P50.105], measured by the WAIS or WASI. The Con-
trol (M531.62, SD59.66) and ASD (M544.86,
SD513.06) groups differed in age [t(25)52.98,
P50.006], so age was included as a covariate in all
analyses. ASD symptom severity was measured in all
participants using the Autism-Spectrum Quotient [AQ;
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001], and alexithymia was meas-
ured using the TAS-20 [Bagby et al., 1994]. Informed
consent was obtained from all participants. Again, the
ADOS [Lord et al., 2000] was used to assess current
functioning of all individuals in the ASD group. Of the
14 participants with a clinical diagnosis of ASD, 13 also
met the ADOS criteria for ASD (10 for autism, 3 for
autism spectrum). Although one of the individuals in
the ASD group did not meet criteria for ASD according
to the ADOS, this individual received a diagnosis from
an independent clinician and scored above cutoff for
autism on the AQ.
Stimuli and procedure. Stimuli were the 486 emo-
tional facial images described above. These comprised
270 ASD expressions (54 females) and 216 control
expressions (0 female). In order to match the number
of ASD and control expressions viewed by each partici-
pant, but maximize the number of poser participants
viewed, each individual taking part in the behavioral
study viewed 216 ASD and 216 control expressions.
Expressions posed by three ASD individuals were, there-
fore, removed from the total stimulus set at random for
each behavioral study participant. Equal numbers of
expression stimuli depicting each emotion and pro-
duced in each posing condition were viewed by all par-
ticipants. Where participants had taken part in
expression production, responses to their own expres-
sions were removed from analyses.
Each trial consisted of a single expression stimulus,
presented on a black background for 800 ms, followed
by a six-alternative forced choice prompt to attribute
emotion to the stimulus. Participants were instructed to
select the emotion that best described the expression.
This was replaced by a prompt to express the degree of
confidence in their choice on a scale from 1 to 9. Stim-
ulus order was fully randomized, and participants were
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blind to both ASD diagnosis of posers, and the posing
condition in which each stimulus was produced. The
task lasted approximately 40 min and was written in
Matlab (The MathWorks, Natick, MA) using the Psycho-
physics Toolbox [Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997].
Results
Recognition accuracy was measured using percentage of
correct trials, due to the inappropriateness of methods
based on signal detection theory, such as d0, with more
than two response options. Analysis of covariance, con-
trolling for age, was performed on accuracy data (pro-
portion of correct responses) with Poser Group (ASD,
NT), Posing Condition (Standard, Communicate, Mir-
ror) and Emotion (Happiness, Sadness, Surprise, Fear,
Disgust, Anger) entered as within-participants variables,
and Recognizer Group (ASD, NT) entered as a between-
participants variable. For all post hoc comparisons,
Bonferroni-corrected statistics are reported. See Table 1
for all means and standard deviations.
A main effect of Poser Group [F(1,24)55.53,
P50.027, ˛250.187] indicated that NT posers
(M50.54, SE50.02) were recognized better than ASD
posers (M50.51, SE50.02; Fig. 2). A nonsignificant
Poser Group 3 Emotion interaction suggested that this
was the case across all emotional expressions, although
the happiness condition was associated with a larger
numerical difference between NT and ASD poser
Figure 1. Examples of stimuli, showing all six emotions posed by one participant in the standard posing condition.
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accuracy, as has been observed previously [Faso et al.,
2014], although not consistently [Volker et al., 2009].
Emotion interacted significantly with Recognizer Group
[F(5,120)53.01, P50.013, ˛250.112], suggesting that
angry expressions were better recognized by NT individ-
uals (M50.59, SE50.05) than by those with ASD
(M50.36, SE50.05) [t(25)53.37, P50.002]. A non-
significant main effect of Recognizer Group
[F(1,24)51.344, P50.258, ˛250.053] indicated that
this was not the case for other emotions.
A significant main effect of Posing Condition
[F(2,48)53.45, P50.040, ˛250.126] indicated that,
across all participants and emotions, expressions pro-
duced in the standard posing condition (M50.49,
SE50.01) were recognized less well than those pro-
duced in the communicate condition (M50.54,
SD50.02) [t(26)55.2, P<0.001] and the mirror condi-
tion (M50.53, SE50.02) [t(26)55.25, P<0.001] (Fig.
3). A nonsignificant Poser Group 3 Posing Condition
interaction indicated that the three posing conditions
were equally effective for the ASD and NT posers.
A nonsignificant main effect of emotion indicated
that expressions of different emotions were recognized
equally well. Emotion interacted with posing condition,
however, [F(10,240)52.62, P50.005, ˛250.098], sug-
gesting that, while the posing conditions did not differ-
entially affect recognizability of most expressions, fear
expressions were better recognized when produced in
the communicate (M50.38, SE50.03) [t(26)53.90,
P50.001] and mirror (M50.34, SE50.03) [t(26)52.56,
P50.018] than standard conditions (M50.28,
SE50.03).
Table 1. Means and standard deviations of accuracy (percentage correct) and confidence ratings in all conditions
Posing condition Emotion
NT recognizer ASD recognizer
NT poser Mean (SD) ASD poser Mean (SD) NT poser Mean (SD) ASD poser Mean (SD)
Accuracy
Standard Happiness 0.88 (0.17) 0.67 (0.14) 0.9 (0.12) 0.77 (0.14)
Sadness 0.44 (0.10) 0.52 (0.20) 0.49 (0.14) 0.57 (0.20)
Surprise 0.44 (0.16) 0.46 (0.19) 0.41 (0.15) 0.44 (0.22)
Fear 0.28 (0.18) 0.36 (0.21) 0.24 (0.16) 0.25 (0.15)
Disgust 0.53 (0.21) 0.51 (0.18) 0.47 (0.14) 0.46 (0.14)
Anger 0.57 (0.25) 0.51 (0.26) 0.31 (0.18) 0.34 (0.15)
Communicate Happiness 0.82 (0.20) 0.66 (0.17) 0.84 (0.13) 0.73 (0.13)
Sadness 0.46 (0.18) 0.48 (0.17) 0.54 (0.21) 0.47 (0.19)
Surprise 0.52 (0.20) 0.53 (0.17) 0.54 (0.14) 0.57 (0.20)
Fear 0.42 (0.25) 0.45 (0.23) 0.29 (0.13) 0.34 (0.18)
Disgust 0.55 (0.15) 0.54 (0.18) 0.64 (0.14) 0.63 (0.16)
Anger 0.61 (0.22) 0.63 (0.18) 0.38 (0.24) 0.42 (0.17)
Mirror Happiness 0.85 (0.18) 0.73 (0.14) 0.93 (0.11) 0.74 (0.15)
Sadness 0.53 (0.19) 0.63 (0.13) 0.53 (0.19) 0.56 (0.19)
Surprise 0.55 (0.21) 0.50 (0.15) 0.62 (0.19) 0.51 (0.18)
Fear 0.45 (0.26) 0.29 (0.14) 0.34 (0.21) 0.3 (0.17)
Disgust 0.5 (0.24) 0.46 (0.14) 0.41 (0.11) 0.48 (0.13)
Anger 0.64 (0.27) 0.52 (0.11) 0.34 (0.19) 0.4 (0.14)
Confidence
Standard Happiness 7.52 (1.28) 6.92 (1.00) 7.64 (1.47) 7.09 (1.34)
Sadness 6.01 (1.62) 6.45 (1.15) 6.16 (1.26) 6.59 (1.37)
Surprise 6.04 (1.40) 6.19 (1.52) 6.68 (1.30) 6.78 (1.29)
Fear 5.9 (1.24) 6.64 (1.37) 6.3 (1.30) 6.46 (1.39)
Disgust 6.7 (1.37) 6.56 (1.42) 7.01 (1.31) 7.16 (1.22)
Anger 6.68 (1.46) 6.93 (1.32) 6.7 (1.34) 6.77 (1.47)
Communicate Happiness 7.05 (1.35) 6.78 (1.38) 7.4 (1.11) 7.01 (1.33)
Sadness 6.29 (1.45) 6.57 (1.34) 6.26 (1.53) 6.68 (1.32)
Surprise 6.36 (1.38) 6.57 (1.54) 6.96 (1.30) 7.35 (1.18)
Fear 6.45 (1.23) 6.51 (1.53) 6.46 (1.30) 6.77 (1.17)
Disgust 6.85 (1.43) 6.65 (1.50) 7.3 (1.12) 7.15 (1.15)
Anger 6.94 (1.49) 6.82 (1.61) 6.73 (1.43) 7.15 (1.23)
Mirror Happiness 7.27 (1.16) 7.2 (1.07) 7.91 (1.17) 7.32 (1.20)
Sadness 6.3 (1.24) 6.47 (1.29) 6.49 (1.39) 6.63 (1.26)
Surprise 6.68 (1.26) 6.68 (1.23) 6.98 (1.32) 7.07 (1.26)
Fear 6.77 (1.34) 6.31 (1.43) 6.81 (1.29) 6.55 (1.46)
Disgust 6.53 (1.50) 6.7 (1.10) 6.77 (1.20) 7.01 (1.14)
Anger 6.93 (1.30) 6.75 (1.44) 6.64 (1.46) 7.11 (1.16)
6 Brewer et al./Expression production in autism INSAR
Due to the small number of female participants, gen-
der effects could not be reliably investigated, but there
were no significant effects of gender on ability to pose
or recognize facial emotion. Further analysis of data
without the inclusion of female stimuli or female recog-
nizers produced the same pattern of results as reported
with the full sample. It should be noted that the analy-
sis without inclusion of female stimuli also led to the
one ASD poser not meeting ADOS or AQ criteria for
ASD being removed from analysis.
For confidence data, an identical Poser Group 3 Pos-
ing Condition 3 Emotion 3 Recognizer Group Analysis
of Covariance, controlling for age, was conducted. This
ANCOVA produced no significant results, suggesting
confidence in recognition of emotional expressions was
not influenced by ASD diagnosis of poser or recognizer,
posing condition, or emotion being posed.
The recruitment of a representative sample of ASD
and NT individuals meant that group analyses accord-
ing to presence and absence of alexithymia was not
possible. Similarly, while correlation analyses indicated
that recognizer alexithymia was significantly associated
with overall emotion recognition accuracy (r520.422,
P50.028), alexithymia and autistic traits, measured by
the AQ, were highly correlated (r50.667, P<0.001). It
is, therefore, impossible to determine whether the
effects of ASD reported above are due to co-occurring
alexithymia or not. Given that alexithymia is prevalent
in the ASD population, however, this does not detract
from the main findings.
As a small number of individuals viewed expressions
produced by themselves, it was possible to compare rec-
ognition of own and other expressions. Poser (self vs.
other) 3 Emotion ANOVAs conducted separately in the
ASD and control groups indicated that individuals with
ASD recognized their own expressions (M50.63,
SD50.15) better than the expressions of other individ-
uals with ASD (M50.50, SD50.07) [F(1,5)57.79,
P50.038]. There was also a main effect of emotion
[F(5, 25)518.85, P<0.001], indicating that happiness
was recognized better than surprise (P50.021), fear
(P50.019) and anger (P50.012), and fear was recog-
nized less well than disgust (P50.010). Emotion inter-
acted significantly with poser [F(5, 25)53.46,
P50.016], indicating that individuals with ASD recog-
nized their own expressions of happiness better than
others’ (P<0.001). In the typical group, despite the
very small sample size, there was also a trend for indi-
viduals to recognize their own expressions (M50.81,
SD50.11) more accurately than those of other individ-
uals (M50.56, SD50.08) [F(1,3)58.80, P50.059], but
poser did not interact with emotion [F(5,15)51.55,
P50.234]. Again there was a main effect of emotion
[F(5,15)55.85, P50.003], but no individual compari-
sons met the threshold for significance.
Discussion
This study investigated the ability of individuals with
and without ASD to recognize emotional facial expres-
sions produced by NT and ASD posers. Results sug-
gested that autistic expressions were more poorly
recognized than NT expressions, regardless of recog-
nizer group (ASD or NT), suggesting that representa-
tions of emotional expressions are atypical in ASD, and
that these atypicalities are idiosyncratic, rather than
Figure 2. Expressions produced by NT posers were better rec-
ognized than those produced by ASD posers, regardless of ASD
diagnosis of recognizer. Note that for illustration purposes raw
data are plotted without the age covariate used in data
analysis.
Figure 3. Expressions produced in the communicate condition
and the mirror condition were recognized better than those pro-
duced in the standard posing condition, regardless of poser
group (ASD or NT).
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systematic and shared, in the ASD population. Both
groups of posers, however, produced more recognizable
facial expressions when the communicative aspect of
facial expression was emphasized, and when visual
feedback was available.
Accuracy results indicated that, regardless of recog-
nizer group, ASD expressions were recognized worse
than NT expressions, in line with previous findings of
“odd” and “unnatural” expressions in ASD [Faso et al.,
2014; Volker et al., 2009]. While the effect size of the
expression production impairment was relatively small,
it should be noted that these expressions were produced
while individuals were deliberately aiming to produce
recognizable emotional expressions, and could suffi-
ciently attend to and prepare for the task. Arguably
impairment would be far greater in genuine interac-
tions, in which individuals are required to process
verbal information, attend to the interaction partner’s
expressions, and produce their own expressions without
explicit instruction to do so. Interaction partners’ fail-
ure to correctly interpret ASD expressions may detri-
mentally affect the social interactions and relationships
of individuals with ASD. Observers may disengage from
individuals who do not express positive affect, or who
express unexpected emotions in the context of the
interaction, meaning atypical expression production is
likely to have negative implications for ASD sociality.
Clearly, determining whether individuals with ASD
also express emotion atypically in more ecologically
valid situations, where expressions are spontaneous,
remains a priority for future research. As real-life inter-
actions involve both spontaneous expressions (assumed
to accurately indicate one’s emotional state) and posed
expressions (thought to be used by the poser to com-
municate attitudes and intentions to others), it is neces-
sary to study both expression types, as each may be
impaired in individuals with ASD. Further, once addi-
tional cognitive and emotional demands are involved
in real-life interactions, ASD expressions may differ
even further from those of typical individuals.
Findings of poorly recognizable expressions in ASD
are consistent with previous work [Macdonald et al.,
1989; Volker et al., 2009]. The current findings extend
existing results, however, by addressing the nature of
the atypicalities. The fact that poser group and recog-
nizer group did not interact suggests that both NT
observers, and others with ASD, find it difficult to rec-
ognize autistic expressions. This suggests that individu-
als with ASD do not share common representations of
emotional expressions. Rather, ASD expressions appear
to be idiosyncratic, and therefore, even more problem-
atic; individuals with ASD are likely to struggle to rec-
ognizably express emotion, regardless of whether they
are interacting with ASD or NT individuals. As many
individuals with ASD may prefer to interact with other
members of the ASD population, this has particularly
strong implications for the success of their social rela-
tionships. Notably, the possibility remains that sub-
groups with common representations of emotion exist
within the ASD population (potentially characterized
by varying levels of alexithymia, given its relationship
with emotion processing in general). As the current
sample is not large enough to determine whether this is
the case, future research should prioritize investigation
of this possibility.
When emotional expressions are produced atypically,
this may be due to atypical internal representations of
the physical features of emotional expressions, limited
understanding of the communicative value of emo-
tional expressions, or poor proprioceptive or motor
feedback when producing emotional expressions. Here,
expressions produced in a standard posing condition
were recognized less well than those produced in either
a communicative or visual feedback (mirror) condition,
regardless of ASD diagnosis, suggesting both NT and
ASD individuals benefit from the emphasis of the com-
municative function of emotional expressions, and
from visual feedback, implicating imperfect representa-
tions of one’s facial movements [Cook, Johnston, &
Heyes, 2013]. Further, ASD expressions were recognized
poorly across all posing conditions, suggesting that it is
not the case that individuals with ASD simply do not
understand that emotional expressions are informative
to others (which would cause the ASD group to exhibit
a greater improvement in the communicate condition
than the NT group), nor that these individuals are less
able than NT individuals to use proprioceptive feedback
to produce emotional expressions (which would cause a
greater improvement in the mirror condition). Instead,
it seems that, despite visual feedback and explicit
instruction to communicate emotion to others, individ-
uals with ASD still produce emotional expressions that
are difficult to interpret, implicating atypical internal
representations of emotional expressions.
Individuals with ASD recognized expressions of anger
less well than did NT recognizers, regardless of poser
group (ASD vs. NT), but recognizer groups did not differ
in their recognition of other emotions. Evidence regard-
ing ability to recognize facial expressions has been
mixed in existing ASD literature [Harms et al., 2010],
but recent evidence suggests that co-occurring alexithy-
mia may explain deficits, where observed [Bird & Cook,
2013; Cook, Brewer, et al., 2013]. In this study, how-
ever, alexithymia and ASD symptomology were highly
confounded, meaning it was impossible to determine
whether alexithymia or ASD caused reduced ability to
recognize facial anger. It is of note that alexithymia
may also be responsible for the atypical expression pro-
duction observed in the ASD group. Future work
should, therefore, specifically match ASD and NT
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groups for alexithymia severity [Bird & Cook, 2013;
Cook, Brewer, et al., 2013], in order to determine the
independent effects of ASD symptomatology and alexi-
thymia on expression production. Future work should
also aim to determine whether ASD or alexithymia
impairs ability to express emotion vocally or using with
body posture [c.f. Heaton et al., 2012].
In conclusion, this study extends previous results
concerning the ability of individuals with ASD to recog-
nize and express emotion. Individuals with ASD pro-
duced atypical expressions, seemingly due to atypical
representations of emotion, rather than simply having
reduced comprehension of the use of emotional expres-
sions, or awareness of their facial movements. These
atypical representations also appear to be idiosyncratic,
meaning members of the ASD populations may struggle
to recognize emotional expressions produced by each
other. These findings strongly suggest that increased
attention should be paid to determining how represen-
tations of emotion in ASD may be trained, in order to
improve social experiences for these individuals. Simi-
larly, they emphasize the importance of those interact-
ing with ASD individuals possessing awareness about
the idiosyncratic nature of ASD emotional expression.
Clearly, reduced ability to express one’s emotion could
be extremely detrimental to the quality of one’s social
interactions and relationships, emphasizing the need
for further work into how expression production may
be improved.
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